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Abstract
Introduction Abundant literature now exists on the accept-
ability of the new pricing measure represented by urban tolls.
However, this literature contains few examples providing a
Bpolitical^ analysis of their introduction. Here, our aim is to
study how the political behavior of individuals, identified on
the basis of general attitudes regarding the principles of regu-
lation and pricing, influences, or does not influence, attitudes
with respect to urban tolls.
Method We study the ex-ante determinants of a vote on urban
tolls. We use the results of a survey performed in France in the
framework of the European Project ExpAcc (Explanatory
Factors of Road User Charging Acceptability). We process
the data using a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) then
perform ordered logit estimation.
Result Regarding the specific question to the referendum, we
show that it would be rejected by electors. We also show that
there is a significant link between general attitudes to regula-
tion by legislation, tax or pricing policies in transport on the
one hand, and the vote in the referendum on tolls on the other.
We confirm that individual self-interest matters a lot in polit-
ical behaviour but that other types of motives also matter
strongly
Conclusion As a consequence, a real-life political analysis
cannot be limited to classical Beconomic^ variables, even if
they matter too obviously. Lastly, our results should be placed
in relation with those concerning the more global issue of the
acceptability of a new pricing measure through, for example,
that of the compensation to be implemented.
Keywords Urban toll . Attitudes . Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) . Ordered logit
JEL Classification R48 . R40 . C10
1 Introduction
Predicting individual intention dealing with main transport
projects is quite difficult. The implementation of an urban toll
can be a good example: this measure was rejected in France at
the end of the 90s [48] whereas it has met with success in
European neighbors such as in Norway in the 90s and after
through congestion charging in London (see [36, 53]),
Stockholm (see [11]) and urban road pricing scheme in
Milan [51].
The literature on the introduction of urban toll is rela-
tively abundant. Different works have illustrated that be-
fore setting up a toll, adapted responses must be given to
the following questions: what compensations can be
Cassandra is the daughter of King Priam. She made many predictions, in
particular during the war of Troy. She predicted the fall of Troy and she
warned the Trojans about the Greeks hiding inside the Trojan horse.
However, except for one, all of her prophecies being disbelieved. She
was unable to do anything to forestall these predictions since no one
believed her. This part of the Greek tragedy is knowing through the
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offered to the Bloser^ users, especially if they are low wage
earners, whether they are located outside the toll perimeter
and who, most often, are captives to cars [7, 14, 19, 22, 48,
58, 65]? What quality and availability can be provided for
modal alternatives [1, 3, 13, 30, 35]? Consequently, to
what should the revenues generated from the toll be
assigned [8, 20, 50, 57, 59]?
More recent and less abundant in this transport literature
are papers that provide a more Bpolitical analysis^ of the in-
troduction of urban toll. This literature seeks to analyze what
determines the votes of electors [3, 6, 9, 17, 24–29, 39], but
without an ex-ante analysis and without really putting the data
to the test, with the exception of Jaensirisak et al. [28, 29],
Gaunt et al. [17] and Harsman and Quigley [24] focusing only
on the UK case study. A better understanding of intention
change is a way of increasing transport policy effectiveness,
as the cost of rejection can be important and sustained finan-
cially by society.
Our objective in this paper is to study how the political
intention of individuals, identified on the basis of general at-
titudes to the principles of regulation and pricing, influences
or does not influence their attitudes to urban tolls? Attitude is
only one of the determinants of intention (with subjective
norms and control perception and intention acts on behaviour
[4]. To answer this previous question, we study the link be-
tween general attitudes to regulation and pricing and the vote
of a referendum on urban tolls. We use the results of a survey
performed in France in May 2011 (N ~ 1 500) in the frame-
work of the ExpAcc project [61].1 First, we use standard OLS
estimation to obtain an overview of the relation between ref-
erendum and socio-economics variables. Providing new vari-
ables in a smaller number, a PCA (Principal Components
Analysis) is then used to analyze general attitudes on regula-
tion and pricing. Results from OLS estimation and PCA anal-
ysis are used to perform more in-depth relation between atti-
tudes to pricing and intention to voting on the issue of urban
tolls.
The results show that there is a significant link between
general attitudes to regulation by legislation, tax or pricing
policies in transport on the one hand, and the vote in the
referendum on tolls on the other. Moreover, we confirm that
individual self-interest matters a lot in political intention but
that other types of attitudes also matter strongly.
The article is structured as follows. We first provide a
review of the literature on urban tolls (Section 2), and then
present the data and method of analysis (Section 3). We
present our results and discuss them in the fourth part
(Section 4).
2 Literature review on urban tolls and vote
The purpose of this review is to identify the issues that are now
subject to relative consensus on the introduction of an urban
toll but also to take stock of works that provide a more polit-
ical analysis. We can notice that road tolls are not strictly the
same as road pricing reform, since tolls are typically route
specific. Road pricing reform is more generic and is perceived
often very differently and less coercive from cordon based or
distance-based charging.
We briefly present the theoretical determinants of individ-
ual votes then a typology of urban tolls and a comparison of
the impacts of urban tolls in the lights of their various effects
on the determinants of votes.
2.1 Theoretical determinants of individual votes
Theoretical determinants explaining individual voting are
widely covered by seminal results coming from social choice
and public choice theories [37, 42, 52]. The analysis of voting
strategies distinguishes two decisional layers: should I vote (or
not)? If I vote, what are (is) my choice motivation(s)?
2.1.1 The downs’ Paradox: should I vote (or not)?
Downs [10] identifies the existence of an individual Bsense of
social responsibility^ for the political system as a whole.
People vote because they have been taught that voter partici-
pation is a necessary precondition for a well-functioning de-
mocracy. Hence, individuals develop a sense of responsibility
and vote in order to sustain democracy. According to the
BDowns’ Paradox^, the costs of voting can be higher than
the benefits and this simple cost-benefit calculus leads to a
poor electoral turnout. One of the explanation is the voter’s
cost–benefit calculus, which can represent a voter’s concerns
for the functioning of her polity, but also other intrinsic bene-
fits provided by the act of voting itself, such as the warm glow
of acting in a pro-social way. However, as compared to the
probability of being Bpivotal^, the time resources I should
engage could refrain myself from voting.
2.1.2 Expressive voting: ideological versus utilitarian
principles
Expressive voting is not only able to explain why citizens
vote, but also how they vote. If individuals decides to vote,
literature shows that his choice will be based either on ideo-
logical (acting morally or against taxes) or utilitarian (self-
interest) principles, or a mix of both [42, 56]. Concerning
those determinants, a clear distinction should be made be-
tween sociotropic votes (welfare effects of a measure on the
society to which I belong, via the impact on the environment
1 ExpAcc - Explanatory Factors of Road Users Charging of Acceptability
– in the framework of ERA-NET SURPRICE. Stockholm (Sweden) and
Helsinki (Finland) were the two others cities studied in this project (for
more details see [23]).
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for instance) and egotropic votes (welfare effects of a measure
that I will support directly, via money loses).
2.2 Typology of urban tolls
Due to the relative consensus on the introduction of an urban
toll, we propose a typology of this measure focusing on its
main issues. Literature identifies the following main issues:
loss for captive users (depending income level, value of time,
residential location, and modal alternative) and choice of rev-
enues earmarking.
2.2.1 Captive users
Due to the time the issue has existed (1970s) and the growing
number of successful toll projects, the issues linked to the
introduction of urban toll are subject to several studies.2 It
penalizes some individuals who form a group of losers that
require identifying and more or less compensating, in partic-
ular when they are captive users. They are considered as cap-
tive car users if they can’t use modal alternative because of its
unavailability or weak availability in particular in terms of
schedules, accessibility (time to access to), and travel time.
Captive users are more often localized on the outskirts. This
need of compensation situates at the heart of the debate the
question of how the revenues of the toll systems are assigned.
Following the works started by Richardson [49], many
authors have established that the urban toll is a regressive
pricing measure [7, 19, 22, 48, 58]. It is regressive because
is penalized both the captive users previously described and
the disadvantage individuals in terms of income. Sometimes,
captive users are also disadvantage individuals. This effect of
tolls on low income sections of the population has been the
subject of empirical investigations in many cases. Applied to
the Bay of San Francisco, Small [58] showed that without
compensation, low income groups lost more than the middle
income groups whereas high income groups were better off.
Although incomes were redistributed on the basis of equality
per capita, all the groups profited but the low income group
profited the most. In the case of the East–west section of the
urban boulevard of Lyon, France, Raux and Souche [48]
showed how a specific measure to reduce parallel lanes led
to the quasi-obligation to pay a toll for the new infrastructure.
The improvement of the service rendered, through time sav-
ings on the new infrastructure and the transfer of part of the
traffic from other links in the conurbation, was not enough to
offset the quasi-absence of freedom of choice. Combined with
a high toll price, it also had a negative effect on the most
disadvantaged users (low income category).
However, Karlström and Franklin [16] conclude that mid-
dle income groups suffer the most when low income class
don’t drive so much. This result is in line with van den Berg
and Verhoef [65]. They underline the need to link the issue of
time value to that of delays. In the case of a congestion toll,
they show that although the drivers whose time is of the lowest
value suffer a loss, this loss is even greater for car drivers who
combine an intermediate value of schedule delays and the
lowest time value for this schedule delays value.
In the case of Stockholm, Eliasson and Mattsson [14]
showed that car drivers who lived outside the conurbation
and those who lived in the center would be affected by the
introduction of the toll. Emmerink et al. [15] had already dem-
onstrated that urban tolls increase the cost of residences locat-
ed outside and at the periphery of conurbation and, for certain
categories of income, they limit this choice of location beyond
the periphery. The impact of the toll is greater for both with
low income and weak capacity to adapt. This capacity is fur-
ther reduced if they travel for work.
This impact of tolling on captive users underlines the nec-
essary discussion on the zones concerned. In particular, the
performance of cordon scheme is critically dependent on the
cordon location. However, showing that charging points se-
lected by even a simple analytical procedure can achieve eco-
nomic benefit from around 50 % higher than predefined cor-
dons, May et al. [40] demonstrate the key role of the local
transport system and urban planning.
2.2.2 Revenues earmarking
Thus many works underlined the importance of the issue of
assigning the revenues of urban tolls that could be used to
compensate certain categories of people. Reasoning in terms
of partial or general equilibrium leads to differences of con-
clusion about whether the revenues should remain assigned
to the transport sector [57, 59] or be allocated to improve
certain types of social aid or reduce taxes [8, 20, 50].
Focusing on the optimal level for public decision making,
King et al. [33], Proost and Sen [46] demonstrate that in the
case of an urban toll, city should decide on the assignment
of the revenues generated from it. Furthermore, city holds
the optimal level of decision. The main reason for this, is
that it is easier to reach consensus in a city than in a region
where interests are less homogenous. Assigning toll reve-
nues to public transport is the key factor of success for this
measure. Armelius and Hultkrantz [3] pointed out that the
number of winners increases considerably when the quality
of public transport is improved at the same time as the toll is
implemented. This improvement benefits both those that
transfer from private car to public transport and those on
the outskirts who already use public transport. Jansson [30]
compared the methods and results obtained by different cost-
benefit assessments performed on the tolls of London and
2 An efficient tariff measure (expressed in terms of time-saving) in the
hypothesis that a congestion problem exists.
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Stockholm and concluded that high quality public transport
was vital to ensure the success of the toll. However, al-
though the quality of public transport is essential to ensure
that users opt for modal transfer, it does not reduce conges-
tion alone [13]. Kottenhoff and Freij [35] observed that
Stockholm’s public transport system was already quite satis-
factory before the toll was introduced. They showed that the
installation of direct (faster) bus lines at the same time as the
toll, attracted new public transport users coming from car.
Furthermore, this additional capacity induces reduction of
the in-bus congestion. Finally, Ahn [1] pointed out that the
more an infrastructure is congested and the more mea-
sures are taken in favor of buses, the more individual well-
being can be improved.
2.3 Determinants of votes in the case of urban tolls
As indicated, a first step of voting strategies is to know if
individuals should vote (or not). In a second step, if individual
decides to vote, his choice will be based either on ideological
(against taxation in general) or utilitarian (self-interest) prin-
ciples, or a mix of both. These determinants of voting are
active in the case of urban tolls.
2.3.1 Voting or not?
According to Downs’ Paradox a simple cost-benefit cal-
culus leads to a poor electoral turnout. For the charging
scheme of Edinburgh, Hencher and Li (2013) notice a
turnout of nearly 62 % of Edinburgh residents who vote
in a referendum on the implementation of a City centre
cordon. The charging scheme was rejected by nearly
75 % of the voters [17]. A frequently observed phenom-
enon on urban toll is that just before a scheme is im-
plemented, support drops to an all times low. This is a
consistent pattern described for Stockholm by Winslott-
Hiseliuset et al. (2009), for Norwegian cities by Odeck
and Brathen [44] and Odeck and Kjerkreit [45], and for
London by TfL [63]. In Manchester, a two-cordon con-
gestion charging scheme was proposed and tested with a
local referendum. The level of turnout is more than
50 % (53,2 %) and the scheme was rejected by 79 %
of voters.
On the other side are cities in favour of urban toll. In
September 2006, the city of Stockholm organised a referen-
dum on its trial congestion charging. The voting percentage is
quite important with 76,4 % but the referendum was coupled
with the general election. Referendum results give a small
majority in favour of keeping the charges: 51.3 % for (243,
055 voters) and 45.5 % against (215,731 voters), with 2 %
blank ballots (9535 voters) and 1.2 % invalid ballots (5825)
[13, 62]. In June 2011, a referendum was organised in Milan
where 80 % of voters supporting a replacement of EcoPass
with an extended congestion charging scheme. Even if it was
coupled with 4 others referendums, only 49 % of the eligible
voters casted their vote. As notice by Henscher and Li (2013)
a major reason for Milan’s success is that the new congestion
charging (Area C) is much simpler compared to its predeces-
sor (EcoPass). Both examples of Stockholm and Milan show
that simplicity and effectiveness of the scheme system are a
condition to reduce uncertainty and then increase of voters’
support.
2.3.2 Ideological determinants of voting
Concerning ideological determinants of voting, literature
identifies three main components: trust in government, polit-
ical affiliation, and distributive concerns.
A reason to oppose congestion pricing is distrust in the
stated reasons for its introduction or the use of the proceedings
from it (for example see [32]). Even if one understands the
economic rationale behind the policy, it is still possible to also
disbelieve that the particular politicians in place to introduce
and manage such a system will do it properly, and stick to the
promises of revenue hypothecation made. And perhaps more
importantly, even if one believes that politicians will do as
promised, one may still be of the opinion that it is principally
wrong for the government to get involved in a particular pol-
icy. One may call the former a pragmatic kind of libertarian-
ism and the latter an ideological kind. Regardless of which,
they are both associated with a low level of trust in
government.
Political affiliation, political left and right, is one of the
ideological determinants of voting and often depending of
fairness ideology background. If even political organization
is different between countries, in London or Stockholm, con-
gestion pricing has been suggested by the political left, and
opposed by the right. On the political left, vertical equity
(concern for the underprivileged see [48]) is a cornerstone of
the ideology. Left leaning politicians who suggest introducing
congestion pricing can then perhaps be assumed to subscribe
to the notion that, at least in Europe, the net effect of the policy
is progressive. On the other end of the political spectrum there
is a traditional orientation toward horizontal equity (concern
for the principles of allocation of resources and responsibility -
user pays principle- or - polluter pays principle-) stressing that
costs should be born to a larger extent by the users. This would
indicate that the political right should be supporting conges-
tion pricing, as user fees ensure that each person pull a larger
share of her own weight. It cannot be denied that the findings
related to fairness fit the political landscape poorly. This
pertaining to trust in the government, which also aligns well
with the left-right scale, work well to explain attitude to con-
gestion pricing. Moreover, as we explain further, the environ-
ment problematic have strong explanatory power, and with
green parties often ending up left-of-centre, this too offers a
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fitting explanation. Thus it appears that in the case of this
particular policy, and the political debate in many European
cities, it is the attitude to the role of government and to the
environment, rather than the fairness of certain allocation prin-
ciples, that has guided the political parties in their opinion
forming.
2.3.3 Self-interest determinants of voting
Another part of the literature shows voting on urban toll can be
determined by self-interest [3, 5, 54, 55]. However a clear
distinction should be made between sociotropic (welfare ef-
fects of the toll on the society to which I belong, via the impact
on the environment for instance) and egotropic votes (welfare
effects of the toll that I will support directly, via time savings,
money loses or benefit from revenue recycling). The amount
of money to be paid has a negative influence on the attitude
toward the system while urban toll green image has a positive
one.
Eliasson and Jonsson [12] show the impact of the environ-
mental concerns as a determinant of attitudes towards conges-
tion pricing in Stockholm. The green self-image of the mea-
sure motivates a vote in favor of the scheme. Jaensirisak et al.
[29] found also that an ability to achieve substantial environ-
mental improvements was more important for acceptability
than the scheme’s perceived ability to deliver concerning con-
gestion relief. Earmarking toll revenues to public transport is
also an argument for the urban tolls [3, 39]. The number of
electors against the measure fell considerably when the toll
revenues were assigned to public transport [9].
Jones [31] and Allen et al. [2] have argued that uncertainty
over its effectiveness is an important reason for the rejection of
congestion charging. More recently on Edinburgh and
Manchester cases studies, Hensher and Li [27] confirm that
uncertainty associated with the effectiveness of congestion
charging influence a vote against this pricing measure.
Gaunt et al. [17] show a massive refusal coming from car-
users and owners both because they have to pay and because
they are not convinced by this measure in reducing congestion
and improving public transport. This lack of effectiveness was
itself linked to the difficulty for the respondents to clearly
understand the toll scheme. This point is useful to understand
that familiarity to congestion charging and its effectiveness
breeds acceptability.
Jaensirisak et al. [28] examine both sociotropic and ergotic
votes on Leeds and London case studies. Results show accept-
ability is influenced by selfish and social perspectives. They
also identify factors influencing selfish and social perspec-
tives. They showed that the toll was more acceptable to non-
car users and younger persons, who perceive pollution and
congestion as serious problems, consider that the present sit-
uation is unacceptable and judge tolls to be an efficient mea-
sure (time-saving). In contrast, bus users and those who
perceive pollution problems as very serious in their city are
more concerned with benefits to society as a whole than ben-
efits to themselves. They also show a difference according to
city as the inhabitants of London were more ready to pay than
those of Leeds.
Gaunt et al. [17] and Harsman and Quigley [24] analyzed
ex-post the results of a referendum on the urban toll in
Edinburgh, where it was not introduced, and in Stockholm
where it was. Harsman and Quigley [24] find that time-
saving and increased costs were decisive factors influencing
voting intention. In the calculation behind their voting, the
respondent trade-off between the time saved by the toll and
the additional cost linked to paying it. Furthermore, they show
a strong link in voting orientations between political and
self-interest motivations, for example between distributive
concerns and political affiliation.
This literature review makes it possible to formulate some
assumptions that will be tested empirically, in particular: to
what extent is a referendum on urban toll reject or not?
What are the self-determinants of vote (environmental con-
cerns, toll road efficiency, socio-economics factors)?
3 Data and method of analysis
We first present the data used and then the analysis method.
3.1 The data
3.1.1 The survey
We performed a survey in Lyon during the second half of May
2011. At that date, Lyon Metropolitan Area (Great Lyon),
France’s second largest city with a city population of
481.000 of inhabitants and a metro area with 2.1 million of
inhabitants. The share of population driving daily is 47 % and
the share of population with access to at least one car is 77 %
(official statistics3). Lyon is not a particular city in terms of
transport pricing in France. Drivers have to pay excise taxes
on oil (nationally fixed), on car purchase (depending on vehi-
cle axle), for getting a driving license (the same for everyone)
and to park their car in some dense areas (with a discount rate
for handicapped). Each day, 570 000 cars enter through Lyon-
Villeurbanne area and 322 000 cars circulate inside this area.
Then because of the congestion, the following regulation
principle Bfirst come, first served^ is used as a reference for
private cars.
The sample chosen (N ~ 1 500) was based on quotas con-
trolled by telephone. It was designed to meet predetermined
quotas for, among other things, age and gender, thereby
3 Official statistics: modal share of trips, based on Household Travel
Survey 2006 (one day of survey, only from Monday to Friday).
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managing the response bias already at the collection stage. In
order to ensure a sufficient share of respondents perceiving the
survey as relevant, a deliberate bias was also introduced, by
oversampling frequent car users and people living inside the
hypothetical charging zone, to higher shares than would have
been the case in a randomized sample of the population of
Lyon. These quotas are representative of Greater Lyon (see
Lyon Household Travel Survey, 2006), apart from the zone of
residence (50 % lived in the toll zone – 41 % for the observed
population - and 50 % outside but within a radius of 15 km
from the city center - 59 % for the observed population) and
the transport mode (2/3 were car drivers, i.e. 1 000 persons –
47.4 % for the observed population) (see map in Appendix 1).
Specific quotas for the zone of residence and the transport
mode are used to collect enough information on categories
with a suspected high level of rejection (see Emmerink et al.
[15], Eliasson and Mattson [17]).
The survey was carried out using a questionnaire adminis-
tered in France by telephone by the company Enov Research.
A total of 10,241 calls were initiated, out of which 53 % pick-
ed up to answer. Out of those answering, 37 % agreed to start
answering questions after having been introduced to the pur-
pose of the call. Then, as the interview went along, some calls
were prematurely terminated, either on request by the respon-
dent, or when the caller system detected that some answer
placed the respondent outside one of the predetermine quotas.
When 1500 calls had led to a complete survey being answered
and all quotas met, the calling was completed.
3.1.2 The questionnaire4
The questionnaire was elaborated by all the partners of the
Expacc project and carried out in all of the three cities, with
some minor local variations. The questionnaire comprises a
first part on general attitudes to the principle of regulation,
taxation and pricing for transport. The general part included
assertions on traffic, transport and pricing. The respondent
had to indicate the extent to which they agreed with these
assertions by answering according to a scale from 1
(absolutely disagree) to 7 (absolutely agree). They could
also express the desire not to answer (NA: No Answer)
(see Table 1).
Another part of the questionnaire was focused on attitudes
to the introduction of an urban toll (see Table 2) and to a
specific cordon charging experiment (see Table 3). For the
part relating to the urban toll scenario, we test a cordon charg-
ing of 3 Euro a day to enter and circulate within the city center.
The assertion was introduced as follows: BOne of the ideas
studied to reduce car traffic would be to introduce cordon
charging around the city, which would entail charging all cars,
vans and motorized two-wheeled vehicles that enter and
circulate within the city. In Lyon, the zone applicable to the
toll would include the central districts of Lyon and
Villeurbanne (see the map attached). The principle would be
that all car drivers entering or circulating inside this zone
would pay a flat rate of 3 Euro a day, or 50 Euro a month,
24/7^. Following the literature presented at the beginning of
the present paper, questions test the effectiveness of the con-
gestion charging scheme, the presence of a modal alternative,
and the distinct impact linked to the level of captivity of the
user.
Lastly, we asked the respondent to tell us how they could
vote if a referendumwas held on the introduction of this toll (If
there was a referendum on the introduction on this urban toll,
how do you vote? Certainly yes, probably yes, probably no,
certainly no or No Answer).
The last part of the questionnaire collected socio-
demographic data on the respondents (see Table 4).
Furthermore, we must point out some limitations, in our
dataset. Firstly, and because it is both difficult to obtain and
quite distinct between France, Sweden and Finland (for
example conservative party in France is quite different
from conservative party in Sweden), in our questionnaire
we do not include question about individuals’ political
habits (do you vote in general? Do you agree with the cur-
rent local/regional/national action?). Secondly, in particular
because we didn’t want both to increase time to answer the
questionnaire and its complexity, we do not present modal
alternatives with real-time information data (location,
availability, and price).
3.2 The analysis method
After an overview on general attitudes on pricing based on a
standard analysis, our analysis method comprises two steps
which need further explanation: in the first step a Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) and in the second steps, ordered
logit estimation using results coming from the previous steps.
3.2.1 Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
In the case of a survey in which several questions are asked,
the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) can be used to
group the answers [43, 66]. It describes the structure of the
correlations between the variables, in our case the 14 ques-
tions asked in the general part of the questionnaire, by provid-
ing a smaller number of independent linear combinations [18].
This makes it possible to create a new variable that can be
substituted for each of the variables of the sub-groups identi-
fied without losing much information.
With 14 items, we haven’t large data sets. However PCA
method can produce interesting results in a first step. As
Golob and Recker [18] write:^It is used to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the data by accounting for redundancy among sets4 The full questionnaire can be obtained from the authors.
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of highly correlated traffic flow variables^ (p. 55). In our case,
the risk of highly correlated responses on general attitudes on
regulation and pricing in transport can be anticipated and
hence justify the choice of PCA method.
Let X(n*p) be the sample where n represents the observa-
tions and p the variables. The observations correspond to the
respondents of the survey and the variables to the 14 questions
asked on general attitudes to regulation and pricing. These
variables are correlated and correspond to the variables to be
studied.



















rij is the value of variable j for observation i.
Table 1 Questions on general attitudes
Numbers
NA (no answer) 1 absolutely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 absolutely agree
It is reasonable that flight tickets cost more for peak hours
and days in comparison to other times - flightph-
30 406 (27.1 %) 183 172 169 225 139 176
It is reasonable that air traffic is subject to a special
environmental tax - flighttax-
35 158 76 101 149 245 266 470 (31.7 %)
It is reasonable that Lyon Public Transport offers reduced
fares outside peak hours - ptoph-
16 228 102 120 133 245 220 436 (29.1 %)
It is reasonable that the noisiest cars and two-wheeled
vehicles are subject to a special tax on noise - cartaxnoise
5 280 95 131 145 215 210 419 (27.9 %)
It is reasonable to fund a new bridge or road by a road toll,
levied from those who use it - tollfinancing-
24 383 (25.5 %) 153 186 215 245 118 176
If a bridge or road is subject to a toll, it is reasonable to offer
a reduction to those travelling at off-peak hours -tolloph -
23 245 113 127 141 281 212 358 (23.9 %)
It is reasonable to travel freely on public transport
(bus, subway, tram, regional train) to reduce bottlenecks
on roads - ptfree-
6 201 110 141 169 197 169 507 (33.8 %)
It is reasonable to build new roads in Lyon to reduce
bottlenecks on roads - newroad -
12 207 121 128 166 247 178 441 (29.4 %)
Bottlenecks on roads are one of the biggest problems in Lyon
– Congestion -
15 74 77 183 229 342 231 349 (23.3 %)
Car and truck traffic is one of the biggest threats to the
environment –carenvir-
11 77 71 144 224 354 255 364 (24.3 %)
Taxes are too high in France – Tax - 34 99 79 122 147 207 171 641 (42.7 %)
Automatic speed camera are a good way to save lives on
the road – camera -
6 250 119 150 187 222 183 383 (25.5 %)
Manymore means should be used to protect the environment
- moreenvir -
5 16 18 31 107 223 273 848 (56.5 %)
The public authorities should give priority to reducing
disparities between the poor and the rich – dfisocial -
30 77 47 95 164 188 211 688 (45.9 %)
Table 2 Questions on the urban toll
Numbers
NA (no answer) Increase Decrease No change
The number of car trips in the toll zone to enter or leave it would… 23 74 972 (64.8 %) 431
The time spent in bottlenecks in Lyon would… 22 147 798 (53.2 %) 533
The number of users of Lyon public transport (bus, subway, tram,
regional train) would…
10 1084 (72.3 %) 69 337
The commercial activity in the toll zone would… 36 149 766 (51.1 %) 549
The quality of life for those living in the toll zone would… 35 737 (49.1 %) 236 492
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The objective of the PCA is to find the projected space
noted S where the variables are not correlated. This space
S(n*p) is a linear combination of X(n*p). Let P be the matrix
of the projections P(n*n), thus we can write: S = P*X









If the receipts of the toll were assigned to improving Lyon public transport 17 48 399 1036 (69.1 %)
If the receipts of the toll were assigned to improving roads in Lyon 15 105 231 1149 (76.6 %)
If the technical system of the toll ensured the anonymity of the users 41 31 94 1334 (88.9 %)
If people with low incomes were given a reduction of the toll price 20 76 344 1060 (70.7 %)
If a preferential rate were given to the residents of the toll zone of
15 Euro/month (instead of 50 Euro/month)
18 72 344 1066 (71.1 %)
If the toll p.m. only operated from Monday to Friday from 7 a.m.
to 8 p.m. for the same price
16 76 192 1216 (81.1 %)
If only those who entered the toll zone paid and not those travelling
inside it (i.e. free for those living in the toll zone)
22 95 396 987 (65.8 %)
Table 4 Socio-demographic
characteristics of the sample General variables Detailed variables Coding for ordered
logit estimation
Numbers Percentage
Residential location Inside the toll zone 1 748 49.87
Outside the toll zone 2 752 50.13
Gender Female 1 851 56.73
Male 2 649 43.27
Age 18–39 years-old 1 682 45.47
40–59 years-old 2 569 37.93
60 years-old + 3 249 16.60
Professional Category Active 1 959 63.93
Inactive 2 541 36.07
Number of people in
household
One person 1 381 25.4
Two to three people 2 750 50.0
Four or more people 3 369 24.6
Car use Rarely or never 1 359 23.93
At least twice a month 2 126 8.40
At least twice a week 3 356 23.73
Every day 4 659 43.93
Type of degree Other Withdrawn from the
base afterwards
160 10.67
None 1 89 5.93
Certificate 2 252 16.80
A-level 3 265 17.67
Degree 4 378 25.20
Master, PhD, etc. 5 356 23.73
Income Less than 1 500 Euro 1 531 35.40
1 500 to 2 500 Euro 2 497 33.13
2 500 to 3 500 Euro 3 162 10.80
3 500 to 4 500 Euro 4 51 3.40
More than 4 500 Euro 5 40 2.67
NA (no answer) Withdrawn from the
base afterwards
219 14.60
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The first line of the projection matrix represents a new axis
that we denote axis 1 (see next Fig. 1), in the uncorrelated set.
The value resulting from this first line permits creating a new
variable. Its variance is the maximum among all the possible
choices (i.e. first principal component). In other words, the
PCA maximizes the variance of the variables measured, ex-
plained by the factors. The second line of the projectionmatrix
has the same properties but without the first Principal
Component5 (see axis 2). Lastly, we note that the relative
positions are interpreted in terms of correlations on the facto-
rial plane of the variables.
3.2.2 The ordered logit estimation
We complete our analysis with an econometric method to test
in greater depth the link between the general attitudes to pric-
ing and a vote in favor of urban tolls. To achieve this we use
ordered logit estimation. The results of the survey can be
considered as ordinals insofar as they can be values from 1
(absolutely disagree) to 7 (absolutely agree). Consequently, an
ordered logit model can be used [41] and provides results on
respondents intention. The question on the referendum is the
variable to be explained, denoted R. The explanatory variables
correspond to the set of 14 questions on general attitudes,
denoted Y.
Thus we have: R = f(Y)
If Y is the response factor with K levels, then the model is
written as follows:
P Y ≤k xjð Þ ¼ Φ θ j−β0x
 
with Φ being the normal cumulative function, θ0 = −∞ < θ1
<⋯ < θK =∞ are the thresholds, x is the vector of the explan-
atory variables and β is the vector of the unknown parameters.
Furthermore, to facilitate analyzing the estimation results, we
reduced the number of items from 7 to 3 for the questions on
attitudes.6 In addition, we withdrew from the base all the
BNA^ and Bother^ answers which could not be ordered.
Finally, the sample remained satisfactory with a size of N =
867. This estimation was performed with different packages
of the R freeware. Since the coding of the responses varies
from 1 (disagree) to 3 (agree), a positive value for a variable
coefficient indicates a tendency to consider the respondent
agree with the proposal.
To obtain a better estimation, we also used control vari-
ables. These variables were chosen because they are signifi-
cant at the end of the OLS estimation. We therefore estimate
that a model comprising the 14 questions to which we added
age, level of education and car use frequency.
4 Results and discussion
First we present overview results, then results of the correla-
tions between the different responses, and the projection of the
question on voting in a referendum on urban tolls. We then
describe this link with ordered logit estimation and, finally, we
discuss the results.
4.1 Overview
Preliminary results show results on general attitudes on pric-
ing and urban toll with frequency distribution tables and stan-
dard OLS estimation using only socio-economic variables (in-
come, car use, age, places of residence) as explanatory factors
to start empirical analysis of the referendum question.
4.1.1 Contradictory attitudes?
Results on general attitudes to the principle of regulation, tax-
ation and pricing for transport are presented in Table 1.
Without surprise, the level of agreement is massive and the
highest for general question on using more means to protect
the environment, on reducing disparities between the poor and
the rich and on the high level of tax in France. While certain
types of measures are currently used, like flight tickets more
costly for peak hours and days in comparison to other times or
road toll for financing new bridge or road, respondents are
against in majority. Even if some resist, the majority of the
respondents consider automatic speed camera are a good way
to save lives, taxes on both the noisiest cars and two-wheeled
vehicles and on air traffic are necessary, and that car and truck
traffic is one of the biggest threats to the environment. They
also consider they need to travel freely on public transport
(bus, subway, tram, regional train) or with reduced tickets
during off-peak periods. However, in the same time, the
majority stays in favor of building new roads in Lyon.
4.1.2 Attitudes on the urban toll: an efficient measure
for reducing car traffic
The next part of the questionnaire is focused on urban toll
implementation. With the objective of reducing car traffic,
we test a cordon charging of 3 Euro a day to enter and circulate
within the city center. Results show respondent massively
consider this measure would reduce car traffic, improve qual-
ity of life for those living in the toll zone and the time spent in
bottlenecks in Lyon. In the same time, they anticipate the
increase of the number of users of Lyon public transport
(bus, subway, tram, regional train). However, they also point
5 For a more complete presentation, see Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis
([66], p.49-50).
6 From absolutely disagree to rather disagree recoded as 1 = disagree;
neither agree nor disagree coded as 2, from quite agree to absolutely agree
recoded as 3 = agree.
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out a negative effect of the cordon on the commercial activity
in the toll zone (see Table 2).
If the cordon charging was introduced, then we proposed
some possible changes: assignment of the revenues of the toll
were assigned to improving Lyon public transport or roads in
Lyon, the insurance of the anonymity of the users with the toll
technical system of the toll, reductions of the toll price for
people with low incomes, residents, and a toll only operated
fromMonday to Friday from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m. The respondents
have to pronounce on how these changes could affect their
attitudes. Responses to this part of the questionnaire are
more surprising as the lack of change is the major response
(see Table 3).
4.1.3 Vote on urban tolls: a strong rejection
It was no surprise that our work first shows that the rejection
of a referendum on the introduction of a toll is strong (67.5 %).
We can moderate this result by the overestimate quota taken
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Fig. 1 Circle of correlations for
questions on general attitudes
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this result more closely, and in relation to the literature, we
present first cross tabulations between responses to the ques-
tion on the referendum and the criteria relating to residence
and job-study locality as well as to car-use frequency in the
zone (Table 5). The works of Armelius and Hultkrantz [3]
show these two variables have a significant effect on the re-
sults of the vote. Rather unexpectedly, they also show that
there is no significant difference in voting according to wheth-
er one lives in or outside the toll zone. Furthermore, the dif-
ferences start becoming more marked when car drivers work
inside the toll zone. But this more marked difference can be
found as much in favor of a negative vote as that of a positive
one. Lastly, unsurprisingly, it appears that the staunchest
opponents of the toll are those who enter the toll zone daily.
To investigate more in-depth the relations shown in
Table 5, we use now a standard OLS estimation between
referendum and socio-economics variables.
4.1.4 A vote linked to age, car user frequency and degree
By treating the regression function coefficients as elasticity
coefficients, we estimated a relationship between response to
referendum and the explanatory socio-economics variables
(residential location, gender, age, job location, income, de-
gree, car use frequency, professional category, size of the
household) (see Table 6). To estimate the model’s unknown
parameters, we use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method.
Following the standard literature [21, 38], the model esti-
mated with the OLS method must be satisfied following con-
straints: the variance of the error is constant (i.e. homoscedas-
ticity or convergence); the error is independent from the
explanatory variables (i.e. no multicollinearity), the errors
are not correlated (i.e. independent).
The model we estimate is robust in view of the two last
constraints. The model is without problem of multicollinearity
(F-statistic: 7.93 on 9 and 1490 DF, p-value: 1.612e-11, with
value of Fisher test (F-statistic) higher than 3.37 we can reject
the null hypothesis, saying coefficients are different) and with
independent errors terms (see values of t-student test).
However, the estimated model is subject to heteroskedasticity
problem (BP = 20.775, df = 9, p-value = 0.01369, p-value
of studentized Breusch-Pagan test (BP) is smaller than
0.05 - for α = 5 %). To deal with, we add a tHC test
(Student t heteroskedasticity-consistent test) [21, 38].
tHC results are significant, the model can be retained.
However, while the model satisfies estimator properties,
the low level of R2 underlines its weak quality of fit mean-
ing in particular the lack of some explanatory variables. We
must remember first that the general objective of the sur-
vey is focused on general attitudes on urban pricing and
second that OLS estimation is a preliminary step for study-
ing political attitudes.
Results for OLS estimation show response to referendum
question significantly and positively correlated to three of
socio-economics variables: age, car use frequency and degree
level (student test more than 1.96). We use specific overesti-
mate quotas for the zone of residence (50 % lived inside the
tolled area against 41 % for the observed population) and the
transport mode (2/3 were car users against 47.4 % for the
observed population) to take into account a potential rejection
effect linked to these variables. However our results do not
confirm the effect of residence location, only car users appears











Location of residence and referendum vote (%)
Inside the toll zone 22 13 11 5 1 52
Outside the toll zone 20 13 11 4 0 48
Total (%) 42 26 22 9 1 100
Location of job-study and referendum vote (%)
Inside the toll zone 17 9 9 4 0 39
Outside the toll zone 14 9 7 2 0 32
Inactive 11 8 6 3 1 29
Total (%) 42 26 22 9 1 100
Fréquence utilisation voiture et vote référendum (%)
Daily 15 5 5 2 0 27
At least twice a week 9 5 4 1 0 19
At least twice a month 5 4 4 1 0 14
Rarely or never 6 6 4 2 0 18
Other 7 6 5 3 1 22
Total (%) 42 26 2 9 1 100
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significant. Furthermore, our results are more in line with lit-
erature in view of the impact of degree on the respondents’
answers.
4.2 Three groups of responses
The resulting chart of the plane of variables is given by the
circle of correlations (Fig. 1 and PCA detailed results are
given in Appendix 2). The first line of the projection matrix
represents the axis 1 and the axis 2 represents is the projection
without the first principal component. The overall result is not
very satisfactory since the variance explained by the first two
components makes up only 29 % of the total.7 The analysis of
the correlation results shows that the images are not all very
close to the circle, indicating that certain points were not per-
fectly represented by the plane.
Nonetheless, certain interesting results of the PCA can be
emphasized, notably by identifying the groups of variables in
opposition to each other. It is first possible to gather the dif-
ferent variables into three groups. The first group, denoted
group I, is strongly negatively correlated with axis 1
(Fig. 1). This axis is interpreted, on the negative side, as
representing pro-environmental values and compensatory
type price incentives (make people pay less during off-peak
hours). This group appears very consistent with what we
found in the literature. Eliasson and Jonsson [12] show a green
self-image was one of the most influential determinants of
attitudes towards congestion pricing in Stockholm.
Jaensirisak et al. [28] find that an ability to achieve substantial
environmental improvements is more important for accept-
ability than the scheme’s perceived ability to deliver
concerning congestion relief. Axis 2 comprises two groups
in clear opposition with each other: group II and group III
(Fig. 1). This factorial axis is negatively correlated with group
II and positively correlated with group III. This axis opposes
the positive side with attitudes against taxes, worries about
congestion and social equity, in favor of improving roads
and free public transport, versus the negative side with atti-
tudes in favor of strong regulations (speed camera), financing
roads through tolls and the taxation of environmental
7 As we explain, our objective is to extract a limited number of factors to identify new variables while simultaneously discarding as little of the
information in the original variables as possible. In the following Table of Eigen values, we can see that the third and the fourth components are both
around 9–10 %. Consequently, it is difficult to separate these two components and means we need to take into account fourth axis. We consider that 4
components are not in line with our objective to extract a limited number of factors.
Table of Eigen values (in percentage)
C1* C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14
17.21 11.85 9.97 9.03 6.75 6.33 5.62 5.42 5.05 4.92 4.84 4.61 4.37 4.03
*C1 : Component 1
Table 6 OLS estimation and
results for tHC Estimate coefficients Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.990009 0.216205 4.579 5.06e-06 ***
Residential location 0.097876 0.058569 1.671 0.0949 .
gender 0.046948 0.054929 0.855 0.3929
age 0.102725 0.042791 2.401 0.0165 *
profcategory 0.012810 0.018786 0.682 0.4954
householdsize −0.038836 0.040086 −0.969 0.3328
car use 0.143701 0.024187 5.941 3.52e-09 ***
job location 0.012235 0.046840 0.261 0.7940
degree 0.088201 0.020511 4.300 1.82e-05 ***
income 0.003639 0.016697 0.218 0.8275
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.044 on 1490 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.04571, Adjusted R-squared: 0.03994
F-statistic: 7.93 on 9 and 1490 DF, p-value: 1.612e-11
Results for tHC test
(Intercept) residential location gender age profcategory householdsize
4.5253274 1.6424001 0.8485635 2.3782631 0.6851496 −0.9418642
car use job location degree income
5.6492772 0.2650504 4.0779579 0.2093391
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externalities and congestion. The diversity of the composition
of these groups makes the analysis less immediate while the
ordered logit estimation allows refining their analysis
The analysis of the results of the circle of correlations also
shows that all the variables are located on the same side, i.e. on
the left hand side, meaning that the respondents more or less
agree with the proposals made. How did we obtain such an
unexpected result? The main explanation lies in the formula-
tion of the questions. Indeed, eight of the fourteen questions
were formulated as follows: BIt is reasonable that…^ and four
other questions were assertions (for example, Btaxes are too
high…^). For the two remaining questions, although more
conditional, their general and almost Bobvious^ nature
(for example BFar more resources should be used to protect
the environment^) encouraged favorable responses, thus
situated more on the left of the graph.
However, it was surprising to find on the left side two as-
sertions with which the respondents did not agree, that is to say
Btoll financing^ (BIt is reasonable to finance a new bridge or
road by a road toll collected from those that use it^) and
Bflightph^ (BIt is reasonable that plane tickets cost more dur-
ing peak hours or days than at other times^). Indeed, as al-
ready explained, with three other questions (Bcamera^, Bcar tax
noise^ and Bflight tax^), they composed a group characterized
by the maximal disagreement with transport pricing.
We shall now focus on the projection of the question of
voting on the toll and on general attitudes to question of pricing.
Figure 2 represents the average of projections of individ-
uals. The axis 1 represents the pro-environmental value and
the pricing compensations. The projections of individuals are
located next to the variables for which they have values above
the average and opposite variables for which they have values
lower than the average. This axis 2 represents preference for
regulation. First there is a difference according to respondents’
votes (Fig. 2). A monotonous relationship can be seen from
for to against, from left to right of the factorial plane and also
from the bottom upwards. This positioning of responses on
the referendum is consistent with the Bmap^ of attitudes
expressed by the factorial plane. Those who voted Babsolutely
for^ or Brather for^ are located towards the left, in the direction
of pro-environmental values and fare compensations, and to-
wards the bottom, in the direction of strong regulations. On
the side of the opponents, only those who voted Babsolutely
against^ can be distinguished clearly, in opposition to the di-
rection of pro-environmental values and that of strong regula-
tions. Jaensirisak et al. [29] and de Groot and Steg (2006)
showed this positive effect of taking environmental questions
into account on acceptance of a toll. This is also the case of the
more recent works of Rotaris et al. [51] on the case of the
urban toll of Milan.
4.3 Can the results of a referendum on urban tolls be
predicted?
We use now an ordered logit estimation to perform a more in-
depth test of this relation between attitudes to pricing and to
voting on the issue of urban tolls. The results of the ordered
logit estimation relating to the question on the referendum are
presented in Table 7. The referendum question is variable to
be explained. As we explain at the end of section 3, 14 vari-
ables on general attitudes tested with PCA and significant
socio-demographic variables are the explanatory variables
coming from OLS estimation. For estimating the ordered
probit model [34, 64], we use BMass Package Bof the software
R [47].
Nine attitude variables have significant influence on the
response to the referendum (cf. Student t test in Table 7).
Those who are in favor of an environmental tax on air trans-
port, a tax on road transport noise and peak hour tolls to
finance roads, and who support environmental values and
are in favor of speed camera to save lives, tend to vote rather
Bfor^ or Babsolutely for^ a referendum on the toll. As already
mentioned, this result highlights the role of environmental
concerns, consistent with the literature. The less negative
















Fig. 2 Projections for the Breferendum^ variable
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attitude towards a toll based on reduction pollution objectives
indicates a possible path for the introduction of a toll regulated
according to the level of emissions of vehicles, in the model of
the Ecopass Scheme in Milan [51]. The trend is reversed for
those who think that new roads should be built to combat
bottlenecks, that taxes are too high in France, or that the
reduction of disparities between the rich and the poor should
be a priority. The analysis of those groups is less obvious.
Nonetheless, we hypothesize that these responses are exam-
ples of the link between voting intention and the quest for
personal interest. In our case study, a rational and self-
interested driver would only support congestion pricing if rev-
enue from the system is spent on something valued by him. In
the 2005 referendum on congestion pricing in Edinburgh,
Gaunt et al. [17] find that car drivers are significantly more
prone to voting « no » than non-car drivers. The correlations
are less significant for the five remaining questions.
The results of the ordered logit estimation on the question of
the referendum (variable to be explained) are given in Table 7
(see significant explanatory variables in bold text).8, 9
Lastly, among the socio-demographic variables present in
the estimation, only that of having a university degree remains
significantly correlated with the question on the referendum
which is in line with the results of Jaensirisak et al. [29]. Less
well-educated respondents tend to vote no to the referendum
on the toll. This effect of education on the attitudes of individ-
uals is a relatively classical result. Harsman and Quigley [24]
showed that a large fraction of residents with a post-secondary
education weremore favorable to the referendum. Souche et al.
[60] highlighted significant differences in attitudes to tolls as a
function of the level of degree of the person questioned. For
example, especially among diploma holders, the non-working
people perceived all the regulatory rules proposed as unfair and
were more adamantly against the urban toll.
5 Concluding remarks
Despite the many works in the literature on the introduction of
new pricing measures such as urban tolls, few focus on their
political dimension. We sought to better understand the ex-
ante determinants of a vote in favor of a referendum on a
possible urban toll. This issue is topical at present in France
since the law known as BGrenelle II^ (2010) authorizes con-
urbations with more than 300,000 inhabitants to experiment
with urban tolls.
Regarding the question specific to the referendum, we first
showed that it would be rejected by electors. We can moderate
8 Note 1: Coding is as following: flightph2 (neutral) is compared to
flightph1 (in disagreement) which serves as item of reference. flightph3
(in agreement) is also compared to flightph1 (in disagreement. A positive
value for a variable coefficient indicates a tendency to consider the re-
spondent agree with the proposal (vote Bfor^). A negative value indicates
a tendency to consider the respondent disagree with the proposal (vote
Bno^).
9 Note 2: polr() is the fitting function for the MASS package. Model fit is
given by AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) which is a measure of the
goodness of fir that takes the number of fitted parameters into account;
AIC = −2*log L + k*edf With L the Likelihood and edf the equivalent
degree of freedom of fit, k the weight of the edf.
Table 7 Ordered logit estimation on the referendum
Coefficients Value Std. error t value
flightph2 0.24348 0.2293 1.06161
flightph3 0.26865 0.1594 1.68516
flighttax2 .02382 0.2797 0.08518
flighttax3 0.58317 0.1928 3.02430
ptoph2 −0.28323 0.2822 −1.00373
ptoph3 0.07166 0.1711 0.41871
cartaxnoise2 0.64174 0.2654 2.41828
cartaxnoise3 0.78232 0.1649 4.74385
tollfinancing2 0.50294 0.2040 2.46551
tollfinancing3 0.72583 0.1612 4.50365
tolloph2 0.81963 0.2697 3.03914
tolloph3 0.25054 0.1717 1.45884
ptfree2 −0.08996 0.2423 −0.37126
ptfree3 −0.08753 0.1636 −0.53494
newroad2 −0.34952 0.2441 −1.43198
newroad3 −0.59539 0.1643 −3.62337
congestion2 −0.01549 0.2329 −0.06652
congestion3 0.15340 0.1813 0.84613
carenvir2 −0.24042 0.2568 −0.93604
carenvir3 0.42778 0.2056 2.08091
tax2 −0.44687 0.2780 −1.60718
tax3 −0.78590 0.1870 −4.20200
camera2 0.51683 0.2343 2.20598
camera3 0.57051 0.1641 3.47675
moreenvir2 −0.06320 0.4329 −0.14599
moreenvir3 0.26089 0.3561 0.73259
difsocial2 −0.05644 0.2686 −0.21015
difsocial3 −0.49082 0.2116 −2.31906
Car2 −0.21047 0.2218 −0.94905
Car3 0.05367 0.2035 0.26378
Car4 0.15316 0.1719 0.89091
Degree2 −0.89302 0.3712 −2.40602
Degree3 −0.49838 0.3626 −1.37445
Degree4 −0.45557 0.3500 −1.30179
Degree5 −0.62054 0.3533 −1.75644
Age2 0.08990 0.1546 0.58157
Age3 −0.12638 0.2003 −0.63110




Residual Deviance: 1754.026 AIC: 1834.026
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this point by the specific quotas we take for two variables, but
the unbalance in favor of rejection is validated. This result is in
line with that of Jaensirisak et al. [28] and also with what
occurred in Stockholm at the end of the trail [13]. Our results
highlight a significant link between the attitudes to control by
legislation or by taxes and transport pricing on the one hand,
and the attitude to a referendum on urban tolls on the other.
In a first step, even if the number of items is quite small, we
apply PCA method to identify common variables between
several questions. Then, we use projections for the
Breferendum^ variable which allow to clearly separating the
pros and cons an urban toll scheme: those who voted Bfor^ a
road pricing scheme are both in favor of pro-environmental
values, fare compensations and strong regulation; on the op-
posite those who voted Bagainst^ do not support pro-
environmental values, fare compensations, and strong regula-
tion. In a last step, we use ordered logit estimation to test in
particular socio-demographic variables influencing voting in-
tention. Results show that only of having a university degree
remains significantly correlated with the question on the ref-
erendum: less well-educated respondents tend to vote Bno^ to
the referendum on the toll.
Moreover, our results confirm that individual self-interest
matters a lot in political attitudes (e.g. how much one drives,
how many cars one has, what is my value of time), but that
other types of motives also matter strongly (e.g. environmen-
tal concerns, whether one thinks taxes are too high). As a
consequence, a real-life political analysis cannot be limited
to classical Beconomic^ variables, even if they matter too ob-
viously. Lastly, our results should be placed in relation with
those concerning the more global issue of the acceptability of
a new pricing measure through, for example, that of the
compensation to be implemented.
Obviously, it is to be hoped that the results obtained by
researchers do not end as so many cries of Cassandra, whose
predictions went unheard, since the risk of rejection of a pos-
sible referendum would be both financially and politically
costly for local authorities whose financial resources are
now greatly limited.
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Appendix 1
The toll zone represents a target population was the one living in a radius of 15 km around the center of Lyon (1,234,843 persons).
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Appendix 2
Principal component
Column normed scores CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5
Percentage of original variance 17.21 11.85 9.96 9.03 6.75
flightph −0.3243037 −0.93773102 −0.70263420 −0.35888382 −0.02704178
flighttax −0.3046202 −0.66828472 −0.54235353 −0.19852254 −0.27314240
ptoph −0.4451506 0.06383313 −0.47224183 0.57041298 0.21060132
cartaxnoise −0.3463386 −0.43708789 0.07591123 0.19224322 0.26233656
tollfinancing −0.1730574 −0.23388032 −0.29579629 0.15775089 −0.60288379
tolloph −0.2790612 −0.03925360 −0.29366739 −0.32178073 0.17629970
ptfree −0.1891979 0.20935908 0.12073194 −0.32389822 0.02254140
newroad −0.1295326 0.24404690 −0.26215386 0.18582865 −0.27369263
congestion −0.2239202 0.15172279 −0.01028211 0.22947814 0.17985106
carenvir −0.2542904 −0.02874725 0.13977748 0.18357313 0.16053925
tax −0.1639006 0.29059408 −0.07167798 0.13634658 0.02004502
camera −0.1544854 −0.17304447 −0.06581128 0.21712315 0.09299406
moreenvir −0.2066786 0.01962530 0.25051098 0.01544969 −0.09953978
difsocial −0.1646900 0.08414749 0.18596374 −0.12987156 −0.22729593
CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10
Percentage of original variance 6.33 5.62 5.42 5.05 4.92
flightph 1.04328370 1.21236423 −0.17436517 0.33425478 −0.99252333
flighttax 0.54768473 0.05673966 0.11040773 0.04222731 0.93163499
ptoph −0.09017578 0.04160436 −0.16412440 −0.18161677 0.43473993
cartaxnoise 0.23646090 −0.83406130 0.14822577 −0.22725172 −0.12227405
tollfinancing −0.05349749 −0.22765166 −0.20969185 0.17833343 −0.06712481
tolloph −0.30115802 −0.09252558 −0.11899480 −0.09645145 0.04003772
ptfree 0.21607484 −0.07857340 0.41018061 0.25747287 −0.12821021
newroad 0.13962712 0.03942181 0.30745197 −0.16470476 0.17187116
congestion 0.24767709 0.04549915 −0.12127779 −0.31920858 −0.16186235
carenvir −0.07337946 0.01806359 −0.13181854 0.33079669 −0.01545578
tax 0.29897599 0.17169990 0.35990163 0.03410379 −0.02125591
camera −0.29897599 0.17169990 0.35990163 0.03410379 −0.02125591
moreenvir −0.07843391 0.23265041 −0.10251417 −0.16259850 0.10599742
difsocial −0.13857000 −0.04787078 −0.01040128 −0.07815296 −0.25795325
CS11 CS12 CS13 CS14
Percentage of original variance 4.84 4.61 4.37 4.03
flightph 0.628174817 0.17799553 0.29051671 0.065399422
flighttax 0.144535288 0.03009386 −0.76702543 −0.102559864
ptoph −0.26539146 −0.18670620 0.11802665 0.879798520
cartaxnoise 0.354019827 −0.03933175 0.44781230 0.102271650
tollfinancing −0.369378020 −0.22261507 0.01630622 −0.107478917
tolloph 0.119196719 0.18636573 −0.13563271 −0.541488233
ptfree −0.253740516 −0.13258668 0.08812982 −0.159124173
newroad 0.093872298 0.36463215 0.08032166 0.007831401
congestion −0.218147542 −0.12045085 −0.26245356 −0.065553746
carenvir −0.185219414 −0.39217658 0.01710201 0.097057240
tax 0.349074903 −0.25098342 −0.03658406 −0.018507649
camera 0.028662253 −0.19458680 −0.10487780 0.044915960
moreenvir −0.008473403 −0.09368542 0.35211272 −0.131469161
difsocial 0.163860405 0.05995749 −0.17206137 0.163278361
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